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Brooks: ADA and Employment Discrimination

THE APPLICATION OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
WHY THE CIRCUITS HAVE GOTTEN IT WRONG
William Brooks*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter
“ADA”) prohibits employment discrimination.1 Title II bars state and
local governments from discriminating against individuals with
disabilities.2 Following the passage of the ADA, courts struggled with
the issue of whether a litigant may file an employment discrimination
claim against a state or local government pursuant to Title II or whether
the ADA limits an aggrieved individual’s remedy to Title I only. This
issue is significant because the statute of limitations period is
appreciably shorter for Title I claims than it is for causes of action filed
pursuant to Title II.3
Initially, federal district courts tended to hold that Title II
served as a remedy for employment discrimination by state or local
governments.4 However, courts then shifted direction and now
generally hold that a litigant may file an employment discrimination
claim against a state or local government pursuant to Title I only. 5
Courts have generally examined the statutory language of Title II in
comparison to Title I and have found that Congress unambiguously

* Thank you to Professor Fabio Arcila for his editorial assistance.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111112117 (2018)).
2 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132-12134 (2018)). Title II prohibits
discrimination by public entities, which include state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. §
12131(1)(A) (2018).
3 See infra notes 12, 18 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 34-64 and accompanying text.
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made clear that it did not intend for Title II claims to cover
discrimination.6
This article will address the issue of whether the ADA
authorizes a disabled litigant to file an employment discrimination
claim against a state or local government pursuant to Title II as to avoid
the shorter limitations period of Title I. It will first review the history
of litigation on the issue. This article will detail why resolution of this
question requires an application of administrative law jurisprudence.
The Attorney General, to whom Congress delegated authority to
implement Title II, has concluded that Title II covers employment.
This article will argue that because the Attorney General has
promulgated a reasonable interpretation of Title II, the interpretation is
entitled to deference.
In concluding that the Attorney General is entitled to deference,
this article will further detail that the rationale courts set forth to
conclude—that Congress clearly intended for only Title I to cover
employment—is not supportable. Moreover, the legislative history of
Title II is clear: Congress intended for Title II to cover employment
discrimination. Accordingly, more than enough support exists for the
Attorney General’s conclusion that Title II covers employment
discrimination.
On the other hand, the Attorney General has also promulgated
regulations that can be interpreted to require a Title II litigant to
exhaust administrative remedies even if he files a claim pursuant to
Title II. This article will explain why this regulation promulgated by
the Attorney General is not entitled to deference. Congress spoke
unambiguously on this issue: it wanted the remedies governing Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act to govern Title II claims and the remedies
governing Section 504 do not require exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
II.

THE STRUCTURES OF TITLES I AND II AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PROVISIONS

In passing Title I, Congress established a detailed statutory
scheme to remedy employment discrimination against disabled
individuals. Congress modeled Title I on Title VII of the Civil Rights

6

See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
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Act of 1964.7 The statute prohibits discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability in connection with the hiring process,
advancement or discharge, compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment.8 The statute defines
a “qualified individual” as one who with or without a reasonable
accommodation can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that the person holds or desires.9 Under Title I, discrimination
includes, but is not limited to, classifying a job applicant in ways that
adversely affect job opportunities, utilizing standards and criteria that
have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability, not making
reasonable accommodation to the limitations of otherwise qualified
individuals unless the employer can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer, and
using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out individuals with a disability
unless the standard, test or other selection criteria is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.10 The remedial provisions of Title
I are the same as those that govern 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, 2000e-5,
2000e-6, 2000e-8 and 2000e-9.11 As a result, a Title I litigant must
exhaust administrative remedies, which includes filing a timely
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter “EEOC”), as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies.12
Title II is a far less detailed statutory scheme than Title I. Title
II prohibits public entities from discriminating against a qualified
individual with a disability. Public entities include state and local
governments.13 Title II defines “qualified individual with a disability”
as someone with a disability, who, with or without modifications to
rules, policies or practices, meets the essential eligibility requirements
7 See Transp. Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 342 F.
Supp. 2d 160, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
8 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018).
9 Id. § 12111(8).
10 Id. § 12112(b).
11 Id. § 12117(a).
12 See, e.g., Transp. Workers Union of Am., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 171. The statute requires a
litigant to file a charge with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days of the alleged
unlawful employment practice, except when an aggrieved individual institutes an
administrative charge with a state or local agency that has been authorized to seek relief. In
this situation, a litigant may file an administrative charge within three hundred days. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1).
13 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A).
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for the receipt of services, or the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.14 In prohibiting discrimination, Congress
provided that no public entity shall exclude a qualified individual with
a disability from participation in, or deny the individual the benefits of
services, programs or activities of the public entity or otherwise subject
the individual to discrimination.
In crafting the enforcement mechanisms for Title II, Congress
directed that the remedies, procedures, and rights of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act serve as the remedies, procedures, and rights that
are to be encompassed within Title II of the ADA.15 Congress next
delegated enforcement authority for Title II to the Attorney General
directing that “the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an
accessible format that implement [Title II].”16 Congress directed that
“[e]xcept for ‘program accessibility, existing facilities’, and
‘communications,’” the regulations governing Title II “shall” be
consistent with the regulations under 28 C.F.R. Part 41, the regulations
that apply to 29 U.S.C. § 794.17 These regulations do not require
exhaustion of administrative remedies.18 The residual limitations
period for personal injury actions in each state where a litigant is
located serves as the limitations period for Title II.19
The regulations that the Attorney General promulgated first
provide, inter alia, that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability
shall, on the basis of disability, be subjected to discrimination in
employment under any service, program, or activity conducted by a
14

Id. § 12132(2).
Id. § 12133.
16 Id. § 12134(a).
17 Id. § 12134(b).
18 The enforcement provisions governing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provide that
the enforcement and hearing procedures governing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
shall govern the enforcement of Section 504. The Supreme Court, when it held that Title IX
does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, recognized that the enforcement
mechanisms of Title IX and Title VI are the same. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
708 n.41 (1979). Accordingly, courts examining the issue have concluded that Section 504
does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Transp. Workers Union of
Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 342 F. Supp. 2d 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Peterson v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1278-79 (W.D. Wis.
1993).
19 Compare McInerney v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that Title II requires a filing of administrative charge within 180 days), with
McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 663-64 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that Title II is
subject to the state’s personal injury limitations period of two years); Hunt v. Ga. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs, 490 F. App’x 196, 198 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); Frame v. City of Arlington,
616 F.3d 476, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (same).
15
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public entity.”20 The regulations further provide that if a public entity
is subject to the jurisdiction of Title I, the regulations of the EEOC set
forth in 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to employment in any service,
program, or activity conducted by the public entity.21 The regulations
further provide that if the public entity is not subject to the jurisdiction
of Title I, the regulations governing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act as set forth in 28 C.F.R. Part 41 govern the employment provided
by the public entity.22
III.

AN OVERVIEW OF LITIGATION ON THE ISSUE

When district courts initially addressed the question of whether
or not Title II authorized claims for employment discrimination, they
tended to find that Title II authorized such claims.23 Courts relied on
different rationale to support their holdings.
First, courts recognized that the Attorney General’s
regulations, which are entitled to deference, authorized such suits.24
Courts also concluded that the legislative history of Title II details that
Congress intended that Title II apply in the same manner as Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and, as noted, Section 504 applied to
employment discrimination.25 In addition, the term “services,
programs and activities” encompasses employment.26 Finally, Title II
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contain very similar
language and the Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone27 interpreted Section 504 to cover employment
discrimination.28

20

28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) (2018).
Id. § 35.140(b).
22 Id.
23 See Transp. Workers Union of Am., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 171-75; Downs v. Mass. Bay
Transp. Auth., 131 F. Supp. 3d 130, 135 (D. Mass. 1998); Saylor v. Ridge, 989 F. Supp. 680,
688 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Dominguez v. City of Council Bluffs, 974 F. Supp. 732, 736-37 (S.D.
Iowa 1997); Bracciale v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 97-2464, 1997 WL 672263, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1997); Wagner v. Tex. A & M Univ., 939 F. Supp. 1297, 1310 (S.D. Tex.
1996); Peterson, 818 F. Supp. at 1278.
24 Transp. Workers Union of Am., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75; Downs, 131 F. Supp. 3d at
135; Dominguez, 974 F. Supp. at 736-37; Bracciale, 1997 WL 672263, at *7; Wagner, 939 F.
Supp. at 1310; Peterson, 818 F. Supp. at 1278.
25 Transp. Workers Union of Am., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 174-75.
26 Dominguez, 974 F. Supp. at 736.
27 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
28 Id. at 625.
21

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

78

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

Consistent with many of the early district court decisions that
found that Title II covers discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit in
Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water Conservation District29
reached the same result. The court first relied on the legislative history
of Title II, which detailed that Congress intended Title II to work in
the same manner as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.30 Next, the
court relied on the plain language of Title II. Regardless of whether
the terms “services, programs or activities” encompassed
discrimination, the last prong of the statute, which protects disabled
individuals from being “subjected to discrimination” covers
employment.31 This term “is a catch-all phrase that prohibits all
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.”32 Finally,
as some district courts found, the Attorney General’s regulations were
entitled to deference.33
One year after the Eleventh Circuit decided Bledsoe, the Ninth
Circuit in Zimmerman v. Oregon Department of Justice34 issued a
contrary opinion, holding that Title II does not cover employment
practices by public entities. The decision contained numerous reasons
to support its contention that Congress did not intend for Title II to
cover employment discrimination claims, which served as a blue-print
for those courts that subsequently followed suit.35 Subsequently, in
Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement System,36 Elwell
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,37
Brumfeld v. City of Chicago,38 and Reyazudding v. Montgomery

29

133 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 821.
31 Id. at 821-22.
32 Id. at 822 (quoting Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 4445 (2d Cir. 1997)).
33 Id. at 822-23.
34 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
35 See Sánchez-Arroyo v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 842 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D.P.R. 2012);
Trickey v. Selig, No. 4:12-cv-285-DPM, 2012 WL 3245956 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2012);
Maxwell v. S. Bend Work Release Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825-26 (N.D. Ind. 2011);
Scherman v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, No. 09 Civ. 2476, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at
*32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); McSherry v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. Civ.A. 1:04-CV-132, 2006 WL
463157 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006); Brettler v. Purdue Univ., 408 F. Supp. 2d 640 (N.D. Ind.
2006); Decker v. Univ. of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
36 707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013)
37 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012).
38 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013).
30
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County,39 the Second, Tenth, Seventh and Fourth Circuits, relying on
similar rationale, solidified the trend that Title II does not cover
employment. In reaching their conclusions, these circuit courts, and
district courts in circuits that have not conclusively resolved the issue,
employed numerous modes of statutory construction to reach their
conclusion.
First, courts initially looked to the language of a statute.40 The
language of Title II limiting the scope of coverage to “services,
programs or activities” of a public entity references “outputs” of a
public entity, not to “inputs” such as employment, as employment is
not generally thought of as a service, program or activity.41 The
subsequent clause within Title II, “or be subject to discrimination”
clause, cannot be read as distinct from the “services, programs or
activities” clause. This is because to prevail on a Title II claim, a
plaintiff must establish that he is “otherwise qualified.” And Congress
defined “otherwise qualified individual with a disability” to mean a
person who is able to meet the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities by a
public entity.42 Since the receipt of services does not encompass the
retaining of a job and employment is not a program or activity, the
definition of a qualified individual with a disability does not relate to
someone in the context of employment, but to only the provision of
services, programs or activities.43
Next, these courts have concluded that even if the wording of
Title II was ambiguous, the structure of the ADA clearly demonstrates
that Congress did not intend for Title II to apply to discrimination.
Congress placed employment specific provisions in Title I, which it
labeled “employment,” whereas Congress failed to place employment
39

789 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 419; Brumfeld, 735 F.3d at 626; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at
1173.
41 Brumfeld, 735 F.3d at 627-28; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1306; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174;
Sánchez-Arroyo v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 842 F. Supp. 2d 416, 433 (D.P.R. 2012); Maxwell
v. S. Bend Work Release Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 2d 819, 824-25 (N.D. Ind. 2011); McSherry v.
Dep’t of Labor & Indus., No. Civ.A. 1:04-CV-132, 2006 WL 463157, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 2006); Decker v. Univ. of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 578 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
42 Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 420; Brumfeld, 735 F.3d at 627; Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State &
Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 169 (2d Cir. 2013); Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1308; Zimmerman, 170
F.3d at 1175; Scherman v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, No. 09 Civ. 2476, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26288, at * 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); McSherry, 2006 WL 463157, at *10;
43 Brumfeld, 735 F.3d at 628; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1308; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1175-76;
Maxwell, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 825-26; Brettler, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
40
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related provisions in Title II.44 In this vein, the Supreme Court in
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett45 suggested in
dicta that Title I expressly deals with employment while Title II deals
with services, programs or activities of a public entity.46
Similarly, under Title I, a qualified individual with a disability
is a person who is able to work, whereas in Title II Congress defined a
“qualified individual with a disability” as one who is eligible to receive
services or participate in a program provided by the public entity.47
Similarly, the concept of “reasonable accommodations” within Title I
relates specifically to employment such as restructuring of jobs and
making existing facilities accessible to employees with disabilities.48
On the other hand, Congress failed to reference employment in any
way in Title II. Where Congress includes particular language in one
part of a statute, but excludes it in another section of the statute, it is
generally presumed that Congress acted intentionally when including
and excluding the particular words.49
Courts also recognize that they must give full effect to each
provision of a statute. The Ninth Circuit in Zimmerman concluded that
“Congress consciously and expressly chose to include the employment
practices of state and local governments in Title I. To hold that Title
II also governs employment practices would render Congress’s special
effort to ensure their inclusion in Title I superfluous”50 or redundant.51
Courts similarly recognized that not only would permitting Title II
employment claims render Title I redundant as to public employees,
but such a holding would also eviscerate the procedural requirements
of Title I applicable to public employees.52
44

Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 169.
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
46 Id. at 360.
47 Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1176-77.
48 Id. at 1177.
49 Brumfeld v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing that
specific language within Title I governing employment situations that Congress omitted in
Title II confirms that Congress wanted to address employment discrimination in Title I only);
Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 169; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177; Maxwell v. S. Bend Work Release
Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 2d 819, 825 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
50 Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177; see also Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 170, 171; Elwell v. Okla.
ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2012).
51 Scherman v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, No. 09 Civ. 2476, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288,
at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); Brettler v. Purdue Univ., 408 F. Supp. 2d 640, 657 (N.D.
Ind. 2006); Decker v. Univ. of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
52 Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 171; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1310; McSherry v. Dep’t of Labor &
Indus., No. Civ.A. 1:04-CV-132, 2006 WL 463157, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006).
45
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Courts further concluded that Congress’s delegation of
regulatory authority also suggests that Congress intended to limit
employment claims to Title I only. Congress gave regulatory authority
for Title I to the EEOC, but gave the Attorney General regulatory
authority for Title II.53 This is significant because providing regulatory
authority to two different executive agencies could result in state and
local governments being subject to conflicting regulations.54 Thus,
courts have concluded that Congress’s failure to direct the EEOC and
the Attorney General to coordinate regulations suggests that Congress
did not intend for Title II to cover employment.55 This is because
Congress was aware of how conflicting regulations could create
problems. Having given regulatory authority over Title I to the EEOC
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to the Attorney General,
Congress directed the EEOC and the Attorney General to develop
procedures that avoided duplication of effort viz-a-viz enforcement of
the statutory provisions. That Congress failed to take steps to avoid
duplication of effort viz-a-viz enforcement of Title I and Title II
suggests Congress never intended for Title II to relate to
employment.56
Two circuits concluded that congressional action after passage
of the ADA supports the conclusion that Congress believed only Title
I governed employment claims. In 1992, two years after the passage
of the ADA, Congress incorporated Title I standards into the
Rehabilitation Act. This constitutes further evidence that Congress
believed that employment related provisions were set forth in Title I
and not Title II.57 The Tenth Circuit similarly found it “bizarre” to
believe Title II covers employment on the ground that Section 504
covers employment when Section 504 ties its employment cause of
action to Title I.58
Courts have also found that the different sources of procedural
remedies further warrant the conclusion that Title II does not govern
employment claims. Titles I and II incorporate their procedural
53

Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178.
Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 170; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178; Maxwell, 787 F. Supp. 2d
at 826; Scherman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at *33; Brettler, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
55
Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178; Maxwell, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 826; Brettler, 408 F. Supp.
2d at 660.
56 Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178; Maxwell, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
57 Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1312 (10th
Cir. 2012); Zimmerman,170 F.3d at 1180-81.
58 Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1312.
54
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remedies from different statutes: Title I derives its remedial procedures
from Title VII while Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides the
remedies for Title II violations. Accordingly, a Title I litigant must
exhaust administrative remedies while a Title II litigant need not
exhaust them. Permitting a public employee to file a Title II
employment discrimination claim would permit public employees to
bypass the congressionally-intended requirement that such claims first
exhaust administrative remedies.59
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the argument that because the
Rehabilitation Act served as a model for Title II, Congress sought to
incorporate the employment provisions of the Rehabilitation Act into
Title II. First, Congress did not incorporate the language of the
Rehabilitation Act verbatim; it only used similar language. In the
Rehabilitation Act, Congress sought to cover “any” program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance. The scope of coverage in
Section 504 is broader than the coverage of Title II, in which Congress
eliminated “any” as the guidepost for the scope of coverage that
Congress limited to “services, programs or activities” of a public
entity.60
Courts have also concluded that the surrounding sections of the
Rehabilitation Act relate explicitly to employment whereas no section
of Title II does. While ambiguity may have previously existed about
the scope of coverage of the Rehabilitation Act, in 1988 Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act to cover all of the activities of entities
subject to the Rehabilitation Act. Congress’s decision to use a
narrower phrase within Title II indicates its intent that Title II was not
to be coextensive with the Rehabilitation Act.61
Furthermore, several provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
specifically contain employment related provisions. Such textual clues
demonstrate that Congress intended that the Rehabilitation Act
specifically cover employment even in the express absence of the
specific mention of employment itself in the statute.62
Having gleaned congressional intent through the language,
structure and context of the ADA, courts concluded because Congress
spoke clearly on the subject, resort to legislative history of the ADA
59 Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1310; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177-78; Scherman, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26288, at *32; Brettler, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 559.
60 Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1181.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1182.
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was not appropriate. 63 For the same reasons, courts determined that
they should accord no weight to the Attorney General’s regulations.64
IV.

DEFERENCE TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
INTERPRETATION OF § 12132 IS WARRANTED

The Attorney General has interpreted Title II of the ADA to
specifically outlaw employment discrimination by state and local
governments. Specifically, the Attorney General has promulgated the
following regulation:
No qualified individual with a disability shall, on the
basis of disability, be subjected to discrimination in
employment under any service, program, or activity
conducted by a public entity.65
Well-settled administrative law jurisprudence of Chevron deference
provides that when Congress passes a statute that contains ambiguity
and grants authority to an administrative agency to implement the
statute, it is “understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first
and foremost by the agency, and [Congress] desired the agency (rather
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.”66
Deference to an agency interpretation of a statute is warranted
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.”67
When statutory language gives an agency broad power to
enforce all provisions of a statute, a delegation of authority is clear.68
63

Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 171 (2d Cir. 2013);
Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1181; Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
64 Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 171-72; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1313; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1173;
1178; Fleming, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 333; Scherman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at *33;
Maxwell v. S. Bend Work Release Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826 (N.D. Ind. 2011); Brettler,
408 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
65 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) (2018).
66 City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (quoting Smiley
v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)); see also Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
67 Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006) (quoting United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
68 Id. at 258.
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For example, language stating that an agency “shall issue regulations
. . . to carry out this subchapter” amounts to a congressional delegation
of authority to the agency to implement particular statutory
subchapter.69
Congress clearly gave the Attorney General authority to
interpret Title II of the ADA: “Not later than 1 year after [July 26,
1990], the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an
accessible format that implement this subtitle.”70 Accordingly,
Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to interpret
what is encompassed by the antidiscrimination provisions of Title II as
set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12132,71 as this authorization to implement
governing regulations was specifically limited to Title II.72
On the other hand, deference to an administrative agency is not
warranted when Congress has clearly spoken on the matter at hand.73
A determination that Congress has spoken clearly on the matter at hand
requires that “the legislative history or the purpose and structure of the
statute clearly reveal a contrary intent on the part of Congress.”74
However, if Congress has not spoken to the “precise” question
at issue, the question for a reviewing court is whether the agency’s
statutory interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”75 A court must give controlling weight to agency regulations
unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the
statute that has directed the agency to fill the legislative gap. 76 If the
agency interpretation of a statute is reasonable, a court is to give the
interpretation controlling weight even if the court would have
interpreted the statute differently.77
As detailed below, persuasive authority exists to conclude that
Congress intended that Title II cover employment claims.
Accordingly, more than enough support exists for the Attorney

69

Id. at 263 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12116).
42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2018).
71 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
72 See Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 263 (limiting authority of agency to only specific provisions
within the subchapter that Congress authorized agency to implement).
73 See, e.g., Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997).
74
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985) (emphasis
added).
75 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 (1984).
76 Id. at 842, 843-44.
77 Region Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999).
70
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General’s interpretation that Title II protects against employment
discrimination.
Accordingly, notwithstanding what courts have said about
clearly expressed congressional intent to limit employment
discrimination claims to Title I only,78 Congress has not spoken
clearly. Rather, any determination that Congress expressed a clear
statutory intent to exclude employment discrimination claims from the
protections of Title II is not supportable.
Conclusions that Congress intended to limit employment
discrimination claims to Title I have resulted from inferences courts
have drawn from the text of Titles I and II.79 At no time did Congress
set forth a clear expression to limit employment claims to Title I, such
as “[c]laims of employment discrimination shall be limited to Title I.”
The absence of such clear statutory language can be contrasted with
clearly expressed intent to subject Title II litigants to the remedial
provisions of Section 504.80
However, by drawing inferences the way they did, courts failed
to examine what evidence or other contrary inferences suggested that
Congress intended to include employment discrimination claims
within Title II. More significantly, the equating of conclusions drawn
from inferences as a clear expression of congressional intent resulted
in courts justifying their refusal to examine legislative history to help
decipher legislative intent.81 Particularly because a court does not
know what one will find when it refuses to look, a court should refuse
to examine legislative history only when statutory text is so clear that
it can be said that contrary legislative history would amount to a
misrepresentation of legislative intent. Particularly, when one
examines inferences that can be drawn to support the conclusion that
Congress intended that Title II cover employment discrimination
claims,82 courts’ failure to examine legislative history was particularly
unwarranted.

78
79
80
81
82

See supra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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The Structure of the ADA Supports the Conclusion
That Congress Intended for Title II to Cover
Employment Discrimination Claims

The passage of the ADA amounted to a continuation of
congressional efforts that began in 1988 to extend existing civil rights
coverage to people with disabilities. In so doing, Congress simply
developed the structure of the ADA from existing anti-discrimination
laws to provide coverage consistent with existing civil rights laws. In
1988, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act (hereinafter
“FHAA”) for the purpose of applying to people with disabilities the
protections of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibited
discrimination in housing. In passing FHAA, Congress drew upon the
Rehabilitation Act to serve, in part, as a model.83
Two years later, Congress passed the ADA. Title I can be seen
as Congress incorporating relevant provisions of both Title VII and the
Rehabilitation Act to protect people with disabilities in employment,
which strongly suggests that these statutes served as a frame of
reference for the scope of Title I.84 Indeed, Congress’s use of Title VII
as a reference point for Title I can be seen when Congress explicitly
indicated that it did not want to incorporate en masse the provisions of
Title I.85 Similarly, Title III of the ADA can be seen as an extension
to people with disabilities of the public accommodations provisions of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86
The framework for Title II of the ADA first developed when
Congress passed Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. In passing Title IX,
Congress provided that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity

83

H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2189.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 54-58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 33637 (drawing from Section 504 and Title VII in defining terms within Title I of ADA); 42
U.S.C. § 12117 (2018) (applying remedial provisions of Title VII to Title I).
85 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 68 (detailing that it did not want to incorporate into
Title I Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII as set forth in in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977), in which the Court held that an employer need not accommodate an employee’s
religious beliefs if accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost for employer).
86 See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (applying remedies of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
public accommodations provisions of ADA); Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d
79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004) (remedies available under Title III of ADA are those that are available
under Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
84
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receiving Federal financial assistance.”87 Although Congress passed
Title IX for the purpose of prohibiting discrimination in educational
institutions, the Supreme Court in North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell,88 interpreted “persons” to encompass employees of educational
institutions, and not just students.89
In so holding, the Court took a position that can be reasonably
characterized as erring on the side of expanding the scope of statutory
protection. The Court decided to interpret Title IX in a manner
consistent with the way other civil rights laws had been interpreted:
broadly.90 It relied in part on legislative history, which revealed that
Congress intended for Title IX to cover employment. The Senate
version of the bill covered employment; the House version did not.
The Conference Committee expressly chose the Senate version,
explicitly stating that “[t]he House recedes.”91
The next part of the relevant statutory history is that Title IX
later served as the model for Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which provides as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . .
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.92
Section 504 was critical when Congress drafted the ADA because not
only did both promote the similar goal of extending statutory
protection to disability status, but Congress used Section 504 as the
framework for Title II of the ADA.93 When Congress passed the ADA,
a unanimous Supreme Court in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone94
had interpreted Section 504 to prohibit all employment discrimination
87

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
89 Id. at 521, 530.
90 The Court began its analysis by stating that “[t]here is no doubt that ‘if we are to give
[Title IX] the scope its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language.’”
Id. at 521 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801
(1966)).
91 Id. at 528 (quoting S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-798, at 221 (1972); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 921085, at 221 (1972)).
92 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018).
93 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
94 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
88

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

15

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 [2019], Art. 6

88

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

by recipients of federal funds.95 At that time, little questions existed
that Section 504 covered employment discrimination as the primary
purpose of federal assistance to promote employment. However, the
Court in Darrone went out of its way to interpret Section 504 to include
all discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance because
this broad approach furthered the Rehabilitation Act’s remedial
purpose of promoting and expanding employment opportunities.96 The
Court further relied on the regulations that enforced Section 504,
which prohibited employment by all recipients of federal financial
assistance, regardless of the primary purpose of the assistance.97
Significantly, at no time did the Supreme Court parse the language of
Section 504 to decipher the meaning of particular clauses of the statute
to interpret the meaning of either “program or activity” or “be
subjected to discrimination.”98
The pertinent language of the ADA’s Title II is almost verbatim
to Section 504:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.99
The legislative history of Title II clearly details that Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act served as the framework for Title II: “Section 202
of the [ADA] legislation extends the nondiscrimination policy in
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to cover all State and
local governmental entities.”100
Those courts that concluded that Title II does not cover
employment have relied, at least in part, on rules of statutory
construction to support their holding.101 This reliance is misplaced
95

Id. at 632.
Id. at 634.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 631-37.
99 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
100 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367; see
also S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 42 (1989).
101 See, e.g., Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 171 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[W]e are required to disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 228
F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000)); Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693
F.3d 1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he commonsense can of noscitur a sociis . . . counsels
96
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when considering Title II. Rules of statutory construction are, no
doubt, logical, commonsense inferences that make sense when a
legislative body drafts legislation from scratch. However, in passing
the ADA, Congress did not do so.
Rather, the ADA is the kind of statute that one Congressman
accused Title IX of the Civil Rights Act as being: a “cut and paste job”
from earlier civil rights legislation.102 When this is understood, the
commonsense logic behind the statutory construction rules used by
courts to support their interpretation that Title II does not cover
employment are no longer as persuasive as they would otherwise be.103
Rather, rules for construing “cut and paste” statutes, i.e., statutes taken
from other statutes, become the operative rules of construction.104
Rules of statutory construction provide that the incorporation
of virtually identical language for Section 504 into Title II evinced a
congressional intent to incorporate the contents of Section 504 as
interpreted by Consolidated Rail Corp.:
When administrative and judicial interpretations have
settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision,
repetition of the same language in a new statute
indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate
its administrative and judicial interpretations as well.105
Likewise, the “meaning and applicability” of a statute that serves as a
framework for another statute is taken as “useful guides” in construing
that a word is given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is
associated.” (alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. 624,
634 (2012)); Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Just., 170 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion of exclusion.” (alteration in original) (quoting Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
102 N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 528 (1982); see also supra notes 75-90
and accompanying text.
103 See infra notes 108-116 and accompanying text.
104 Accordingly, the failure of courts to examine legislative history, which would enable
courts to place the structure and language of the ADA in its proper context have resulted in
courts examining the structure and language of Title II as if Congress drafted the statute from
scratch. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
105 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998); see also Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 590 (2010) (copying of same statutory language
into another statute supports inference that Congress understood the meaning of law as it had
been interpreted); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 n.3 (1992) (discussing that words
transplanted from another statute contains same meaning unless direction to the contrary
exists).
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the newer statute, at least when the “language and history” of the newer
statute suggest an interpretation that is not contrary. 106 Indeed, when
particular words in one statute have been interpreted in a particular
manner and are then used in a second statute, they “become a term of
art” that takes on a particular meaning.107
B.

The Legislative History of the ADA Also Supports
the Attorney General’s Interpretation of Title II

In addition to rules of construction for similar statutes, the
legislative history further establishes that Congress intended that Title
II cover employment. Indeed, as detailed below, resort to legislative
history is appropriate when analyzing the scope of the ADA in general
and Title II in particular, and whether the Attorney General’s
interpretation of Title II is reasonable.
Legislative history reveals that Congress first intended to
incorporate in toto the protections of Section 504 into Title II:
The Committee has chosen not to list all the types of
actions that are included within the term
“discrimination”, as was done in titles I and III, because
this title essentially simply extends the antidiscrimination prohibition embodied in section 504 to
all actions of state and local governments.108
That Congress emphasized that it intended to apply the
antidiscrimination protections of Section 504, which included
protection against employment discrimination, to all actions of state
and local governments, without qualifying this statement in any way,
constitutes highly persuasive evidence that Congress sought to
incorporate protection against employment discrimination into Title II.
Other parts of Title II’s legislative history provide further
support for concluding that Congress intended that Title II cover
employment. Congress created one significant substantive difference
between Section 504 and Title II. Section 504 prohibits discrimination

106

N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 529.
See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 483 (1990) (“[W]here a phrase in a statute appears
to have become a term of art, . . . any attempt to break down the term into its constituent words
is not apt to illuminate its meaning.”).
108 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367
(emphasis added).
107
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solely on the basis of one’s disability.109 Title II prohibits
discrimination by reason of disability.110 When making this change,
both the House and Senate ensured that individuals interpreting Title
II would understand this distinction by explaining why Congress
changed “solely” to “by reason of.”111 It is likely that if Congress made
a concerted effort to ensure that those interpreting the ADA would
understand the significance of the change from “solely” to “by reason
of,” if Congress also intended the change of the significance of “under
any program or activity” in Section 504 to “services, programs or
activities” in Title II, Congress would have explained the significance
of the change in language.
Next, when Congress attempted to explain how the
replacement of “solely” with “by reason of” would impact on what
actions would constitute discrimination under Title II, Congress used
a hypothetical situation to illustrate how the change of wording would
operate on discrimination analysis. Out of a virtually limitless set of
hypothetical factual scenarios from which Congress could choose, it
chose a case of employment discrimination.112 This is a strong
indication that Congress envisioned Title II covering employment.
When determining whether an agency has reasonably
interpreted congressional intent, the Supreme Court has not hesitated
to turn to legislative history to decipher legislative intent.113 In the
109

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
111 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 85-86; see also S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 42 (1989).
112 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 85.
113 See, e.g., Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998); NLRB v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1987); Chem. Mfrs.
Ass’n v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1987). Ironically, the Supreme
Court’s recent criticism of legislative history as a means to decipher congressional intent can
just as easily serve as a basis to criticize the failure of courts to use legislative history to
decipher congressional intent. The Supreme Court has equated resort to legislative history as
“an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S 546, 568 (2005) (quoting Wald, Some Observations on the
Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214
(1983)). However, resort to the very many rules of statutory construction, the application of
which may, as the issue at hand illustrates, yields different results, is itself like picking out
your friends in a crowd. If a court is going to attempt to decipher congressional intent, then it
may not choose only some modes of analysis, but all modes of statutory interpretation that
may help decipher congressional intent. The failure of courts to rely on legislative history has
resulted in courts failing to understand the context of the language within Title II. As a result,
courts have not applied rules of statutory construction that are most applicable when
deciphering the meaning of statutes that have been taken from other statutes. The result has
been an interpretation of Title II that is at odds with congressional purpose.
110
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present case, Supreme Court warnings against relying upon legislative
history to decipher legislative intent lack applicability.114 This is
because this is not a case in which the legislative history is “murky,
ambiguous and contradictory” as to preclude legislative history from
becoming a useful tool.115 Rather, a reading of the entire legislative
history of the ADA reveals that there is nothing that calls into question
what amounts to clearly expressed intent that Congress wanted to
incorporate all the protections of Section 504 into Title II and not limit
employment discrimination claims to Title I only.116
C.

In Light of the Structure of the ADA and its
Legislative History, Courts’ Conclusions that
Congress has Clearly Expressed an Intent to
Exclude Employment Discrimination Claims for
Title II are Particularly Lacking in Merit

Decisions of the courts that have found that Congress clearly
expressed an intent to limit employment discrimination claims to Title
I, which justifies a rejection of the Attorney General’s regulations,
cannot withstand scrutiny. As noted, courts first found that the text,
language and structure of the ADA evinced a congressional intent for
only Title I to cover employment discrimination.117
When analyzing the text and structure, the Second Circuit
reasoned that a statute’s titles and headings can serve as a tool of
statutory intent.118 Title I directly covers “Employment” whereas Title
II covers “Public Services.”119 The dicta in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett120 buttresses the Second Circuit’s
conclusion that the respective titles serve as a reliable tool of statutory
intent: “‘Title I of the ADA expressly deals with th[e] subject’ of
114

See Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 567-69.
Id. at 568.
116 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II); S. REP. NO. 101-116.
117 The issue of whether Congress clearly expressed an intent to limit employment actions
to Title I has been relevant not only to the issue of whether the regulations of the Attorney
General are entitled to deference but also whether congressional intent is so clear as to warrant
a refusal to examine legislative history to decipher congressional intent. See Mary Jo C. v.
N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2013); Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1307 (10th Cir. 2012); Zimmerman v. Or.
Dep’t of Just., 170 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 1999).
118 Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 169.
119 Id.
120 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
115
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employment discrimination, whereas Title II ‘deal[s] with the
“services, programs or activities of a public entity.”’”121 This suggests
that Congress did not intend for Title II to cover employment
discrimination because where Congress includes particular language
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
statute, it is generally presumed that Congress intentionally omitted the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.122
This rationale lacks merit. First, at no time did any of the
parties in Garrett brief the issue of whether Title II covers employment
discrimination and the Supreme Court did not come remotely close to
addressing this question.123 Accordingly, to say that Title I directly
deals with discrimination while Title II deals with services, programs
or activities of a public entity is to both state the obvious while begging
the questions of what constitutes “activities” and what is the scope of
the clause that provides that no qualified individual shall “be subjected
to discrimination.”
To find clearly expressed congressional intent to limit
employment to Title I only, courts have reasoned that Congress
defined a “qualified individual” in Title I in terms of employment
while it defined “qualified individual” in Title II as someone who
meets the essential eligibility requirements for receipt of services or
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.124
This does not justify limiting employment cases to Title I only because
“activities” encompass employment, as the Supreme Court expressly
recognized in North Haven, and implicitly recognized in Consolidated
Rail Corp. Hence, courts should define “qualified individual” in Title
II consistent with this interpretation. Indeed, doing so harmonizes the
definition of “qualified individual” in Title II and Title I.
Nor can the specific language in the ADA support a conclusion
that Congress expressly intended that only Title I cover employment.
First, nowhere in Title I, Title II, or any place else in the ADA did
121

Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 169 (alteration in original) (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360

n.1).
122

Id.; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1309-10.
See generally Garrett, 531 U.S at 356; Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000) (No. 99-1240), 2000 WL 821035; Brief for the
Respondents Patricia Garrett and Milton Ash, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2000) (No. 99-1240), 2000 WL 1593420.
124 Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 169; Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1308; Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Just.,
170 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999); Scherman v. N.Y. State Banking Dep’t, No. 09 Civ.
2476, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010); McSherry v. Dep’t
of Lab. & Indus., 2006 WL 463157, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2006).
123
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Congress use words such as “only” or “exclusively” in reference to the
coverage of employment in Title I. Accordingly, those courts that have
found the language of the ADA to support its conclusion that only Title
I covers employment have had to draw inferences from the language
of Title II; inferences that are also not supportable when examined
closely.
To illustrate, in finding “services,” “programs,” and
“activities” are normally considered “outputs,” the Ninth Circuit
posited the following questions that someone might ask a Parks
Department employee: what are the services, programs and activities
of the Parks Department? Likewise, the employee might ask a citizen
inquiring about department activities, what are the services, programs
or activities of the Parks Department in which you want to
participate?125 The court reasoned that an individual might answer “I
want to participate in the Wednesday night basketball league.”126
However, activities are necessarily considered “outputs” only when
viewed from the perspective of an outsider: one who seeks the benefits
that result from the provision of services and programs that the
government offers to the public at large. An equally valid hypothetical
question that the Ninth Circuit could have posed might have been from
the assistant to the Parks Department supervisor who asked his boss
the following: “what are you doing today?” A typical response might
be “I’m interviewing some people who want to be hired as referees for
the Wednesday night basketball league” or “I’m meeting with the
union representative.”
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the applicability of
Consolidated Rail Corp. on the ground that the language of Section
504 is broader than the language in Title II. The court reasoned that
Section 504 prohibits discrimination “under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance,” whereas Title II prohibits
discrimination “in . . . the services, programs or activities of a public
entity.”127 The court’s attempt to justify this distinction does not stand
up.
The court emphasized that by prohibiting discrimination in any
program or activity, Congress sought to provide the same broad
coverage in Section 504 that it provided in Title IX. However, in
passing Title II, Congress limited the prohibition against
125
126
127

Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1181 (alteration in original).
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discrimination by public entities to services, programs and activities,
which the court concluded was an “outward-looking focus.”128
However, if services, programs and activities are outward-looking in
nature, why doesn’t the clause “any program or activity” in Section
504 have the same outward-looking focus? Does the word “any”
change the content of what is encompassed by “program or activity”
in Section 504? The answer is, more likely than not, “no.” More
importantly, it can be said beyond doubt that the answer is not so clear
as to justify not examining legislative history or simply recognizing
that the Attorney General’s interpretation of Title II is reasonable.
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit’s attempt in Elwell to rely on the
language of Title II to conclude that it does not cover employment is
also subject to second-guessing. The court concluded if “activities”
encompassed outputs such as employment, then such an interpretation
would eat up the words “services” and “programs” and render them
superfluous. The court reasoned that an interpretation of “activities”
contravenes the principle of statutory construction that courts should
not construe words as to render them superfluous.129
Numerous reasons exist why the Tenth Circuit’s analysis can
be subject to criticism. First, the Tenth Circuit failed to recognize that
when confronted with the meaning of “program or activity” within
Title IX, the Supreme Court interpreted both words in tandem to
encompass employment.130 Moreover, no one can seriously dispute
that in passing Title II (and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act),
Congress wanted to subject services, programs and activities to the
constraints of Title II.131 That Congress provided that Title II (as well
as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) prohibits public entities from
excluding from participation or denying the benefits of “services,
programs or activities”132 suggests that Congress attempted to ensure
broad coverage by adopting language that incorporated overlapping, if
not interchangeable, concepts. This would enable courts to understand
that Title II, having incorporated the protections of Section 504, which

128

Id.
Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1307.
130 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
367 (stating that Title II “simply extends the anti-discrimination prohibition embodied in
section 504 to all actions of state and local governments” (emphasis added)).
132 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
129
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in turn, incorporated the protections of Title IX, would cover any and
all actions by a covered entity.
Nor does the requirement that a Title I litigant must exhaust
administrative remedies necessarily support the inference that
Congress could not have intended for Title II to cover employment
because it permitted Title II litigants to avoid exhausting
administrative remedies.133 This rationale assumes that Congress
imposed the exhaustion requirement to limit prompt access to the
courts or otherwise impose a procedural hurdle for litigants raising
employment claims. When Congress passed Title VII, this was not the
case. Rather, Congress enacted the enforcement mechanisms of Title
VII to strengthen the ability of the EEOC to reduce discrimination in
the workplace.134 A comparatively brief statute of limitations period
for any employment claim enhances the ability of the EEOC to
investigate and remedy claims of discrimination. The short limitations
period prevents evidence from becoming stale or otherwise difficult to
gather; a necessity for any agency charged with remedying
discrimination nationwide.
On the other hand, the brief limitations period significantly
weakens one purpose of the ADA: to provide a clear and
comprehensive mandate to eliminate discrimination.135 The shorter
limitations period will enable state and local governments to escape
liability when a plaintiff fails to meet the shorter limitations, which in
turn weakens the deterrent aspect of an otherwise available damages
remedy.136
Nor does the conclusion that interpreting Title II to authorize
employment would render provisions of Title I superfluous or
redundant137 serve as persuasive authority for the conclusion that
Congress did not intend for Title II to cover employment
discrimination. The Supreme Court “has [repeatedly] recognized that
Congress has provided a variety of remedies, at times overlapping, to

133 Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1310; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177-78; Scherman v. N.Y. State
Banking Dep’t, No. 09 Civ. 2476, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19,
2010); Brettler v. Purdue Univ., 408 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
134
H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 3 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2138.
135 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018).
136 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
137 Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1177 (emphasis added); see also Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 171;
Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1309; Scherman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26288, at *32; Brettler, 408 F.
Supp. 2d at 657; Decker v. Univ. of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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eradicate employment discrimination.”138 The rule of statutory
construction that a court should interpret statutes to avoid redundancies
and superfluous provisions is built on the assumption that it is illogical
for a legislative body to create duplicate measures in a statute.
Recognizing that Congress has in the past provided overlapping
remedies to combat employment discrimination refutes this
assumption. It is not illogical for Congress to err on the side of
overlapping provisions in order to ensure that some individuals that
Congress seeks to protect do not fall through unforeseen legislative
cracks. Or, as is likely the case with the ADA, Congress need not take
the time to fine tune a statute when it can accomplish its goals through
broad legislative strokes that are overlapping, specifically
incorporating significant portions of Title VII and Section 504 into the
ADA.
Finally, courts have relied on Congress, two years after passage
of the ADA, incorporating the standards of Title I into the
Rehabilitation Act.139 Under these circumstances, courts have deemed
it is “bizarre” to find an employment discrimination cause of action in
Title II on the ground that Title II is tied to the Rehabilitation Act when
the Rehabilitation Act ties itself to Title I.140 It is not bizarre at all.
As noted, Congress adopted Section 504 from Title IX; both
statutes contained broad language but without detailed standards.141
As Congress wanted to make Section 504 less amorphous by adding
standards to govern judicial decision-making, the one statute covering
disability discrimination that contained standards was the only logical
choice for Congress to draw upon. It does not mean that a different
Congress could not have intended to incorporate the provisions of
Section 504 into Title II. Subsequent congressional action cannot
justify refusing to examine legislative history.

138

N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26 (1982).
Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 421 (4th Cir. 2015); Elwell, 693 F.3d at
1312; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178.
140 Elwell, 693 F.3d at 1312; Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1183.
141 See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
139
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Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title II
are not Subject to the Exhaustion of Remedies
Requirement

Depending on how one interprets a relevant regulation, 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b), granting deference to the Attorney General’s
regulations governing employment discrimination under Title II, has
the potential for creating a pyrrhic victory only for litigants. This
regulation provides that if a public entity is subject to the jurisdiction
of Title I, the regulations of the EEOC set forth in 29 C.F.R. Part 1630
“apply to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted
by a public entity.”142 As detailed below, it is unclear whether this
regulation requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The provisions within 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 implement Title I of
the ADA. Part 1630 contains provisions relating to the rights and
remedies provision of Title I as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12117.
However, the regulations contain substantive content only.
Specifically, Part 1630 contains provisions relating to (1) the definition
of “disability,”143 (2) the exclusion from coverage of individuals
“currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs,”144 (3) what constitutes
discrimination and other prohibited activity under the ADA,145 (4)
defenses available to entities subject to Title I,146 and (5) conduct
specifically permitted under Title I.147
One can argue that since Part 1630 implements Title I of the
ADA, its incorporation into Title II pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)
incorporates the exhaustion of remedies requirement of Title I.148 On
the other hand, one can also argue that since the regulations relate to
the substantive contents of Title I only, the incorporation of these
regulations into Title II pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b) results in the
incorporation of these specific provisions, which relate to issues of
liability. These regulations do not directly address remedial provisions
of which the exhaustion of remedies requirement is a part.
Ultimately, this is a moot point because an interpretation of
section 35.140(b) requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b) (2018).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2018).
Id. § 1630.3.
Id. §§ 1630.4-1630.13.
Id. § 1630.15.
Id. §§ 1630.14, 1630.16.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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expressly contravenes 42 U.S.C. § 12133. As noted, an agency is
entitled to deference only when legislative gaps create statutory
ambiguity.149 On the other hand, “when a statute speaks clearly to the
issue at hand” a court “must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.”150
In section 12133, Congress clearly provided that litigants
raising claims of discrimination pursuant to Title II shall be subject to
the administrative procedures governing Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
section 794a of title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights
this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the
basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.”151
Accordingly, section 12133 speaks to the “precise question at issue.”152
Hence, the ADA precludes interpreting 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b) as
requiring litigants to exhaust administrative remedies.153 Such a
reading contravenes congressional intent. Accordingly, while the
ambiguous nature of section 12132 requires deference to the Attorney
General, the unambiguous nature of section 12133 warrants a refusal
to defer to the Attorney General if the Attorney General’s regulations
are interpreted to require the exhausting of remedies.154
V.

CONCLUSION

Courts that have concluded that a litigant may not bring an
employment discrimination claim against a public entity under Title II
of the ADA have erred because they have failed to give deference to
149 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”).
150 Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843); see
also Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239 (2004) (same).
151 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2018).
152 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 600 (2004) (explaining that Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretation is
warranted “only when devices of judicial construction have been tried and found to yield no
clear sense of congressional intent”).
153 See also supra note 18 and accompanying text; 28 C.F.R. § 41.5 (2018) (adopting
enforcement procedures of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Title VI does not require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp., 201 F.3d 188, 191
(3d Cir. 2000).
154 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent.”).
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the Attorney General’s regulations that authorize such under Title II.
These courts have inappropriately applied rules of statutory
construction to improperly conclude that Congress expressly intended
to limit employment discrimination claims to Title I. Congress did not
so intend as a proper application of statutory construction rules and the
ADA’s legislative history strongly suggest that Congress intended to
incorporate the contents of Section 504 into Title II. More
significantly, Title II is an ambiguous statute as to which Congress
authorized the Attorney General to promulgate administrative
regulations governing its implementation. For this reason, and
consistent with Chevron and its progeny, the Attorney General’s
regulation extending Title II protection to employment discrimination
claims is entitled to deference. The Attorney General’s interpretation
of Title II is more than reasonable. A reading of the legislative history
of Title II and rules for statutory construction applicable to Title II
establishes that if the Supreme Court was to address this issue de novo,
a conclusion that Congress intended to subject employment
discrimination by state and local governments to Title II is more
warranted than a finding that Congress did not.
In properly formulating this remedial avenue, it is important to
recognize that any employment discrimination claim pursuant to Title
II is not subject to an exhaustion of remedies requirement. Congress
clearly intended that Title II litigants need not exhaust administrative
remedies. Accordingly, any regulation that may require exhaustion is
not entitled to deference and is not valid. Hence, if interpreted
correctly, Title II should enable public employees whom the ADA
protects to benefit from the longer limitations period of Title II.
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